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Freezing of assets 
 
In this decision Judge Thompson refuses to order the freezing of the assets of accused 
Norman pending trial. There are basicly two reasons given for this decision. The first is 
that there is no explicit provision in the basic documents of the Special Court and the 
second is that the nexus between the targeted assets and criminal conduct or illegality is 
lacking. I was not convinced by the arguments that support the decision. 
 
Whether the Special Court may freeze assets 
The Prosecution in its motion relied on Article 15 of the Special Court Agreement, 
2002, Ratification Act, Rules 47 (H) (i), 54, 104 and 105 of the SC RPE as well as on 
case law of the ICTY.1 Judge Thompson finds that these provisions do not give an 
explicit legal basis for measures of freezing assets, but are limited to forfeiture in cases 
in which a person is convicted. The question is whether such an order requires an 
explicit basis as for instance can be found in Article 93, paragraph 1, sub k, of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
 
It is logical that when the law of the Special Court provides for forfeiture as a final 
measure, it will also provide for freezing as a provisional measure. This is an inherent 
logic of the law, as was also recognised by the ICTY.2 If one would wait until 
conviction, there might nothing be to confiscate anymore.3 This lies at the reasoning for 
every international instrument on the freezing and confiscation of assets.4 On the same 
basis as the ICTY did so, the Special Court could have based such an order on the 
general power of Rule 54 SC RPE. It is remarkable that in citing the Milosevic decision, 
Judge thompson did not mention that ICTY Judge Hunt discussed the question whether 
Rule 54 ICTY RPE could already be used in cases in which the accused was still at 
large. This suggests that in a situation, as in this case, in which the accused is in 
                                                          
1 ICTY, Decision on Review of the Indictment and Application for Consequential Orders, Prosecutor v. 
Milosevic, Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic and Stojiljkovic, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Judge Hunt, 24 May 
1999, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-III-35. 
2 The decision notices that there was only one decision relating to the freezing of assets, see par. 9. To my 
knowledge, no other similar applications have been lodged with either ICTY or ICTR. 
3 See also the doubts expressed by Sluiter in his commentary to the Milosevic decision in Klip/ Sluiter 
ALC-III-48, footnote 31. 
4 See for instance the 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime, European Treaty Series no. 141, that distinguishes between provisional and final measures.  
See also the European Union Framework Decision of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European 
Union or orders freezing property or evidence, Official Journal of the European Union 2003, L 196/45. 
detention, there can be no dispute about the applicability of Rule 54.5 That this is in the 
spirit of the drafters of the law of the Special Court can be adstructed by the Co-
operation Agreement between the International Criminal Police Organization-Interpol 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which provides in Article 2 that information will 
be exchanged “ with regard to assets and any asset – or fugitives-tracking activities 
Interpol may be involved in.”6
 
The decision fails to identify in the end what the legal basis for freezing orders is. That 
is astonishing given the criticism of Judge Thompson with regard to the legal bases the 
Prosecutor indicated. All of a sudden from paragraph 11 onwards the decision follows a 
track in which a freezing order is possible, but the question merely is whether it fulfils 
the applicable test. 
 
Whether there is a nexus between the assets and crime 
Since I am unaware of the evidence presented before the Special Court I am unable to 
judge whether the decision corresponded with the facts. However, a few words with 
regard to the test imposed are necessary. The requirement is that “there is clear and 
convincing evidence that the targeted assetst have a nexus with criminal conduct or 
were otherwise legally acquired. (…) Neither probable cause nor mere suspicion or 
speculation will suffice.”7 This is a test that seems to impose a threshold that is equal to 
a conviction. Thus, it imposes a standard much too high for a provisional measure. In 
doing so, the decision seems to be based on Rules 104 and 105 SC RPE, which can be 
used when convicting an accused. That may be exactly the desired applicable standard.  
 
 
                                                          
5 The Special Court RPE do not contain a provision, like Rule 61 (D) ICTY RPE to freeze assets in the 
case of a failure to execute an arrest warrant. 
6 Agreement published on the Special Court’s website. 
7 Decision, par. 13. 
